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Abstract 
Television as a medium is in transition. From DVRs, to Netflix, to HBO Now, consumers have never before had such con-
trol over how they consume televisual content. The rapid changes to the medium have led to rhetoric heralding the im-
pending “post-TV era.” Looking at the ways that legacy television companies have adapted to new technologies and 
cultural practices suggests that rather than traditional television going the way of radio, television as a medium is actu-
ally not terribly different, at least not enough to conclude that we have entered a new era. Press releases, discursive 
practices by the news media, corporate structures and investments, and audience research all point to the rhetoric of 
post-TV as being overblown. By thinking about contemporary television as being in transition, greater emphasis and atten-
tion can be placed on the role that major media conglomerates play in developing, funding, and legitimizing new forms of 
television distribution, in addition to co-opting disruptive technologies and business models while hindering others. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2012, a new ‘television’ service was launched that 
would allow subscribers to access live and recorded 
over-the-air (OTA) television programming on any de-
vice with an Internet connection. Dubbed Aereo, the 
service challenged traditional definitions and business 
models for television by rending the ‘Where?’ of live 
television consumption out of the living room and sev-
ering the ‘How?’ of it from the television device. 
Aereo’s business model was built on the assumption 
that viewers wanted to consume content on the go; 
they wanted to be unshackled from the living room 
couch (Stelter, 2012a). By capturing OTA signals and 
storing them on a cloud-based server, Aereo gave its 
customers what was essentially a DVR that could be 
accessed by phone, tablet, or computer. 
Company executives realized Aereo would upset 
the broadcast networks and their affiliates and thus 
tried to avoid litigation by providing each customer 
with an antenna (and thus a license) which would 
transmit the feed to the cloud-based server. Doing so 
meant that Aereo itself was not transmitting the signal, 
a legality which they believed meant they were in the 
clear. However, the networks sought an injunction 
which was initially denied (Stelter, 2012b) before mov-
ing to the Supreme Court. There, the streaming service 
was handed a resounding 6–3 defeat with the Court 
agreeing with broadcasters that Aereo functioned as a 
cable system by retransmitting signals (Liptak & Steel, 
2014). Shortly thereafter, Aereo filed for bankruptcy 
and sold off its remaining assets. 
Despite its fate, Aereo is an interesting case study in 
the rapidly evolving field of television distribution and 
consumption. While the company attempted to disrupt 
entrenched models of the industry, it also followed prac-
tices of multichannel vídeo programming distributors 
(MVPDs)—namely, the retransmission of local broad-
casts. The only difference was Aereo would not be pay-
ing retransmission fees to broadcasters and their affili-
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ates. Effectively, what Aereo did was begin the construc-
tion of a cable system (Handel, 2014), complete with a 
wide selection of OTA channels, as well as licensed cable 
networks (such as Bloomberg News). The methods of 
distribution and consumption for Aereo were different 
than those of traditional cable and satellite providers, 
but the way in which the programming and content was 
structured was remarkably similar (indeed, MVPDs were 
silently rooting for Aereo to succeed because it would al-
low them to challenge the legality of the compulsory 
carriage fees from broadcasters). Rather than a revolu-
tionary actor in the contemporary media landscape, 
Aereo might be considered a service which is caught be-
tween traditional and emergent paradigms. 
Aereo is not alone in the rapidly evolving television 
landscape. Numerous platforms like internet protocol 
television (IPTV)1, over-the-top (OTT) content2, or sub-
scription video on demand (SVOD) services like Netflix 
and Hulu have emerged in the past decade as chal-
lengers to traditional television broadcasters and 
MVPDs. The situation has reached such a critical mass 
that many scholars and journalists have begun touting 
the ‘post-TV era’ as a fait accompli or at the very least 
a moment that is looming in the near future (Leverette, 
Ott, & Buckley, 2008; Poniewozik, 2014; Strangelove, 
2015; Thompson, 2015). The industry itself seems cog-
nizant of the tumultuous waters it is seeking to trav-
erse, as many media conglomerates endured a week-
long stock market rollercoaster in August of 2015, due 
in part to uncertainties surrounding television’s future 
(Lang, 2015b). Perhaps most exemplary of the television 
industry’s uncertain future was Disney CEO Bob Iger’s 
suggestion that ESPN—widely considered the most val-
uable channel in cable and satellite packages—could be 
sold as an OTT offering in the coming years (Pallotta, 
2015). Such a move could be the straw that breaks the 
camel’s back with regards to the bloated bundles that 
have come to characterize MVPD television packages. 
However, we have yet to reach that point. While 
the media landscape has diversified and expanded at 
unprecedented rates in the past 20 years, the industry 
itself has largely remained composed of the same play-
ers present in the 1940s during the medium’s forma-
tive years and the 1980s when MVPDs emerged as im-
portant components of the television ecosystem, 
although market consolidation and conglomeration 
have introduced a mix of new owners3. Not only are 
                                                          
1 IPTV is television that is transmitted over the Internet that 
does not require an MVPD contract. 
2 OTT describes any content which can be accessed inde-
pendently from MVPDs, although it still usually requires a sub-
scription to the content provider. 
3 As of 2012, 90% of media outlets (including television) were 
owned by the same six firms: News Corporation, Comcast, CBS, 
Disney, Viacom, and Time Warner (Lutz, 2012). There have 
been no major changes in media consolidation since, although 
Comcast attempted to purchase Time Warner Cable before the 
the major corporations that control traditional televi-
sion production and distribution outfits mostly the 
same, they also are positioning themselves in strategic 
locations in the ‘post-television’ distribution field, as 
shall be discussed later in the article. If the major me-
dia corporations remain at the heart of emerging forms 
of television production, distribution, and consump-
tion, how useful is it to discuss the contemporary me-
dia landscape as ‘post-TV’? When home video arose in 
the late 1970s, why was that socioindustrial develop-
ment not discussed in the context of ‘post-cinema’? 
The historical moments seem congruent. Thus, if we 
want to better understand the contemporary historical 
context of television as both an industry and soci-
otechnological apparatus, we must avoid assuming 
that new systems of distribution and consumption in-
herently signal revolutionary changes. 
Instead, as media archaeologist Geert Lovink re-
minds us, scholars should read their media object of 
study “into history, not the other way around” (2003, 
p. 11). Taking such an approach limits teleological pit-
falls and allows the scholar to make connections be-
tween distinct historical eras, emphasizing the links be-
tween different technological apparatuses. While 
media archaeology generally deals with technologies 
and not industries, I incorporate elements of it as a 
methodology when appropriate, particularly when ex-
amining the ways new methods of television distribu-
tion and consumption relate to traditional ones. Along 
with media archaeology, I also employ a critical politi-
cal economy approach as elucidated by David 
Hesmondhalgh in order to better situate the relation-
ships between industry, technology, and culture. In 
particular I utilize a critical political economy approach 
because it examines long-term changes in the relation-
ships between politics, industry, and media in culture 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 33), a component that is es-
sential in understanding the connection between con-
temporary television and ‘traditional’ TV. By taking the 
pertinent aspects of media archaeology and augment-
ing them with a critical political economy approach, I 
avoid both engaging in the rhetoric of technological de-
terminism and developing a grand narrative of televi-
sion distribution history. 
Put simply, I argue that rather than use the rhetoric 
of ‘post-TV’ to describe the current moment in televi-
sion history, scholars should consider this a period of 
transition for the medium, similar to the way that 
Amanda Lotz (2007) formulates her conception of the 
‘post-network era.’ By thinking about contemporary 
television as being in transition, greater emphasis and 
attention can be placed on the role that major media 
conglomerates play in developing, funding, and legiti-
mizing new forms of television distribution, in addition 
to co-opting disruptive technologies and business 
                                                                                           
FCC implied it would reject the deal (Brodkin, 2015). 
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models and at the same time hindering others. While 
being cognizant that consumers have greater agency in 
this transitory period, I focus most of my attention on 
industrial firms in this essay because they are the ones 
who are, for the most part, currently shaping the way 
content is distributed. Despite new delivery technolo-
gies emerging across the globe, I generally focus on an 
American context because many of the largest media 
corporations and new methods of distribution are lo-
cated in the country or have been rapidly adopted 
there; similar studies could be conducted across differ-
ent cultures using the same framework, however. 
2. What Is Television? 
When discussing the applicability of the term ‘post-TV’ 
to today’s media landscape, it is important to first de-
fine what is actually meant by television. Television is 
more than just the material technologies and the sto-
ries they broadcast, just as cinema is more than the 
theater and films. Television includes (but is not limited 
to): advertising; the cable and satellite infrastructure 
necessary to transmit signals; systems of audience 
measurement; national communications regulations; 
regimes of copyright; audiences; labor negotiations; 
and transnational flows of culture. The interconnected 
structure of television is an integral part of understand-
ing it as a concept rather than an object or technology. 
Thus, I will be referring to the ‘television apparatus’ 
throughout, often shortening it just to television, in or-
der to highlight the important relationships between 
technology, culture, industry, and the state. 
The capabilities of modern televisions are indicative 
of technological convergence and its attendant conver-
gence culture, which Henry Jenkins (2006) suggests 
opens up the possibilities for a greater participatory 
culture. New forms of culture require new ways of talk-
ing about them, particularly as consumers find new and 
resistant uses for technology. Amanda Lotz suggests 
that in an era of increasing technological convergence 
we should reconceptualize television audiences as 
niche groups that seek narrowcasting as opposed to 
broadcasting (2007, p. 5), while at the same time ac-
knowledging that no medium has yet to fill the void for 
a mass, heterogeneous audience. Lotz’s recognition of 
the lack of replacement for the needs of a mass audi-
ence is important because the audience still exists, par-
ticularly for marquee events like major world news and 
high profile sporting events like the Super Bowl or the 
Olympics, and speaks to the continuing relevance of 
television as the main technological apparatus that can 
serve the needs of a wide, diverse audience.4 
Technological convergence impacts more than just 
the way audiences are constructed by networks, it also 
                                                          
4 Despite the increasing prevalence of streaming video, live 
events are still primarily watched on television. 
influences the forms and content of television produc-
tions. Working from a production studies perspective, 
John Caldwell has argued that television aesthetics in 
the digital era work in accordance with production 
practices that prefigured Lotz’s post-network era; spe-
cifically, Caldwell points to five ‘protodigital’ elements 
of production: “ancillary textuality (repurposing, mi-
grating content); conglomerating textuality (conver-
gence texts, TV/dot-com sites); marketing textuality 
(branding); ritual textuality (pitching, writing by com-
mittee); and programming textuality (stunting, 
sweeps)” (2004, pp. 46-47). These are protodigital 
strategies because they prefigure the post-TV era, yet 
see their utility maximized in an era of convergence. 
For example, ancillary textuality is arguably responsible 
for the way that (American) television is structured to-
day (Kompare, 2005); while much critical attention is 
paid to original network programming, syndication 
makes up most of the programming for a large number 
of television channels. An era with a proliferation of 
viewing devices and platforms only increases the ne-
cessity of repurposed content and many of the ‘disrup-
tive’ television services like Hulu relied exclusively on 
licensed television content to attract customers. The 
Web also allows the television industry to expand on 
its practice of conglomerating textuality by providing a 
space for viewers to interact with augmented narra-
tives and worlds, such as webisodes or alternate reality 
games (ARGs).5 Caldwell’s reading of contemporary tele-
vision production practices as protodigital is useful in re-
focusing scholars’ attention towards residual cultural 
practices, emphasizing their connection with the past. 
Along the same lines, William Uricchio points to the 
continued relevance of Raymond Williams’ (1974) con-
cept of ‘flow’ for contemporary television. Whereas 
Williams conceptualized flow as an industrial strategy 
to suture television programming (including advertis-
ing) into a coherent, never-ending cavalcade of con-
tent, Uricchio positions his definition of flow in terms 
of the viewer. Owing to the technological interventions 
of the VCR and remote control, Uricchio’s flow is de-
pendent on the actions and choices of the viewer as 
opposed to the network programmer (2004, pp. 168-
172). Uricchio’s point is well taken: Not only does he 
repurpose a bedrock concept of the field, he also his-
torically contextualizes both Williams’ and his own 
concept of flow, noting the myriad technological, regu-
latory, social, and economic generative mechanisms 
that define how we interface with television. Uricchio 
                                                          
5 Webisodes are shortform pieces that provide more story or 
background information for the main televisual text. ARGs use 
the main text as the source for different types of games that 
fans play alone or with one another in order to connect more 
deeply with a text. One of the most famous ARGs was The Lost 
Experience, a complicated narrative based on ABC’s Lost and 
the show’s mythology. 
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also keenly notes that rather than the contemporary 
televisual moment being one of revolution, we should 
instead consider it as a transitory period and, in this 
way, presages Amanda Lotz’s (2007) categorization of 
television’s tripartite industrial history. 
Writing from a slightly different perspective with 
regards to the ongoing transformation of television, 
Michael Strangelove suggests that “a major industrial 
shift is occurring in the nature of viewing devices, 
modes of production, and distribution systems” and 
that the “primary movers of this are not the television 
and film industries but the consumer electronics indus-
try, the Internet, and the online audience” (2015, pp. 9-
10). Like Uricchio, Strangelove sees the increasing 
agency of viewers and users as acutely symptomatic of 
contemporary television. Unlike Uricchio, though, 
Strangelove attributes this shifting of agency to a new 
technological order, one whose ideological ground is 
dictated by consumer electronics manufacturers and 
telecommunications companies rather than the media 
industries. This is one point where Strangelove’s argu-
ment is lacking: many of the traditional media powers 
are part of multinational conglomerates that include 
manufacturers and telecommunications giants. Elihu 
Katz (1996) also sees shifts in television audiences, alt-
hough his research focuses on the disintegration of the 
last medium of public space, laying the blame with a 
proliferation of channels from which audiences can 
choose. From Katz, we can see further evidence that 
the decline of ‘television’ has been heralded for dec-
ades. However, the continuing prominence of estab-
lished media corporations is an essential component of 
my argument that television is in a transitory period with 
regards to production, distribution, and consumption 
practices, yet is not truly removed from the broadcast 
model that has informed its operations for 70 years. 
Despite the “developing analytical orthodoxy” (Tay 
& Turner, 2010) of the end of television, the myriad so-
cial and industrial practices, technologies, and regula-
tions that constitute the television apparatus suggest 
that television as we know it remains a vibrant if not 
evolving medium and cultural object. Audiences may 
have more consumptive agency and the devices on 
which they consume content may be changing, but the 
fact remains that a small number of media corpora-
tions determine the layout of the televisual landscape 
and audiences continue to engage with their media 
firms (Webster, 2014). In the next section, I unpack the 
myriad ways in which media and telecommunications 
companies, with the help of the state via de-regulatory 
policies, continue to maintain a stronghold on the 
meaning of television. 
3. A Crowded Field 
The options audiences have for consuming television 
are rapidly expanding. By the MPAA’s count, there 
were zero legal services for American viewers to watch 
film and television online in 1997, while that number 
has since grown to more than 110. Through these ser-
vices, consumers watched more than 66.6B television 
episodes with that number estimated to grow to 
101.6B by 2019 (Fried, 2015). Such numbers are cer-
tainly gaudy and speak to the potential offered by the 
Internet to expand the way consumers access televi-
sion content; however, scholars should be careful to 
take them at their face value because the raw numbers 
do not speak to the ownership structures and business 
models behind online video distribution. To get a bet-
ter sense of what the 66.6B television episodes 
watched online mean in the larger televisual land-
scape, I will look first look at the digital services offered 
by legacy television, including networks and MVPDs. 
Far from conceding defeat, traditional television play-
ers are actively integrating disruptive technologies and 
models to fortify their position within the market. I will 
then look at two of the newer, most prominent SVOD 
services currently in the field—Hulu and Netflix—in or-
der to contrast the narrative of the post-TV era, focus-
ing specifically on their financial structures and market 
shares, followed by a brief examination of YouTube. 
Rather than a steady march towards the end of televi-
sion, closer examination of the contemporary home 
media field reveals a complex industry made up of tradi-
tional and emergent firms competing against and com-
plementing one another, often with both coopting each 
other’s business practices and distribution methods. 
3.1. Networks and MVPDs Go OTT 
Entrenched media powers have been historically hesi-
tant to alter their business models in ways that might 
jeopardize their bottom line. Film studios were initially 
reluctant to embrace home video out of fear that it 
would crater theatrical attendance and take copyright 
control out of their hands (Greenberg, 2008); more re-
cently, the music industry’s reticence to distribute ma-
terial online led to Apple becoming a dominant figure 
in the market and dictating licensing terms (Burkart & 
McCourt, 2006; Parks, 2012). Despite the Luddism of 
media industries, they have each successfully integrat-
ed emergent business models into their own. Televi-
sion is no different and after initial reluctance to 
change from a linear model, networks and MVPDs are 
slowly offering OTT and IPTV options for viewers. 
Network veteran CBS was the first broadcaster to 
offer a standalone OTT package in 2014. The network 
announced it would offer viewers access to full seasons 
of most of its current shows, as well as older program-
ming (although not to their NFL coverage) for $5.99 per 
month with CBS All Access (Poggi, 2014). CBS’ decision 
was remarkable because both networks and MVPDs 
have historically been against standalone services as it 
would damage the viability of the cable television bun-
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dle (Kafka, 2015). Speaking at the international televi-
sion trading expo MIPCOM, Starz executive John Pen-
ney goes further: “OTT is a real part of the ecosystem 
at this point. It’s no longer a second or third choice or 
window for a market; it’s considered right along with 
the cable channels and broadcasters. It’s not a scary 
thing so much as an opportunity—an opportunity to 
grow the pie and reach more people” (Dawn, 2015). 
Penney’s comments make clear that networks recog-
nize that distributing their content online, in conjunc-
tion with either a MVPD or standalone OTT subscrip-
tion, is now a virtual requirement for survival. This may 
be construed as evidence that we are now in a post-TV 
age; however, considering the political economy be-
hind such moves, it seems the dominant interests have 
adapted aspects of disruptive services to retain their 
power. Many other networks, both broadcast and ca-
ble, have also recognized the necessity to adapt to the 
new technoeconomic environment, including Show-
time, NBC, and AMC (Roettgers, 2015; Spangler, 2015a; 
Spangler, 2015c). 
One network that has embraced alternative forms 
of distribution with gusto is HBO. Historically an inno-
vator in television, HBO became the first network to 
transmit its programming via satellite in 1975, leading 
the way for the MVPD revolution in the 1980s. The 
company’s most relevant contributions to the discus-
sion of a ‘post-TV’ era are HBO Go and HBO Now, two 
OTT subscription services. HBO Go launched in 2010 
and was available to all subscribers of its linear televi-
sion counterpart; the service allowed viewers to watch 
HBO original programming, licensed films, and sporting 
events on the Web, mobile and TV-connected devices 
(such as Roku or AppleTV), and select videogame con-
soles. HBO Now—launched in April of 2015—is identi-
cal in terms of features to HBO Go with one major dif-
ference: HBO Now is available as a standalone OTT 
subscription service. 
HBO Now is an important player in the field of dis-
ruptive TV services because it demonstrates that net-
works are willing to adapt to a changing field and em-
brace streaming while retaining their linear outlets. 
Critics have suggested that services like HBO Now 
threaten the business models of linear television, but 
HBO CEO Richard Plepler disagrees, arguing that tele-
communications companies like Comcast and AT&T 
should be embracing the service because it allows 
those companies to upsell other broadband-based 
products (Wallenstein, 2015). Essentially, Plepler is say-
ing HBO Now is targeted at ISP customers who do not 
have a cable or satellite subscription yet are interested 
in specific TV content. It should be noted that HBO 
Now has not become a revenue generator for the net-
work yet due to initial marketing and technology costs 
(Lang, 2015a), although executives see it becoming 
highly profitable in the near future as cable providers 
realize its potential to bring in consumers who use the 
Internet for their media entertainment yet do not sub-
scribe to television. 
While in part a reaction to the new distribution 
models of SVOD and other streaming services, OTT 
subscription models have precedent with linear televi-
sion in the form of premium cable networks like HBO, 
Showtime, and Cinemax. It is true that premium net-
works require a cable or satellite subscription, yet OTT 
services also require subscriptions to distribution infra-
structure via an ISP or cellular service provider. Thus, 
while network adoption of OTT is in part reactionary, it 
should still be viewed as evidence of the staying power 
of the dominant television paradigm. 
Additionally, MVPDs have begun experimenting 
with new viewing options for consumers. Recognizing 
the necessity to adapt to the new environment of cord-
cutters and cord-nevers,6 providers like AT&T and 
Comcast are offering IPTV services at lower prices than 
linear TV bundles. Comcast executive Matt Strauss 
compared new digital distribution models to the music 
industry, suggesting that Xfinity Stream and others will 
be as easy as ordering a song online (Spangler, 2015b). 
Consumer demand has been the impetus behind the 
new services and is a major part of the emerging TV 
Everywhere movement which has seen cable providers 
offer untethered access to programming on mobile de-
vices and MVPDs and networks recognize the urgency 
of the situation due to the increasing number of 
households which pay for broadband service but not 
TV with 10.7 million households opting out in 2014, up 
16% from 9.2 million of 2012 (Steel, 2015a). 
Cable providers’ willingness to adapt their business 
models should give scholars pause before perpetuating 
the narrative of the death of television. With the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 deregulating the media 
landscape, an almost unprecedented number of ISPs, 
MVPDs, and networks have been merged into tele-
communications behemoths. While the effect this has 
had on television and Internet subscription prices is 
concerning, it has allowed for greater flexibility among 
traditional TV firms, most recently evidenced by AT&T 
and DirecTV’s merger fostering the birth of AT&T’s new 
telephone, Internet, and TV bundle that allows sub-
scribers access from any device with an Internet con-
nection. The increased diversity of options available to 
the consumer from legacy TV firms have caused some 
media analysts to caution against expecting a revolu-
tion in television distribution (Koblin, 2015), particular-
ly because the rate of cord-cutting has slowed signifi-
cantly as the economy improves (Nielsen, 2013). With 
that said, it is important not to downplay the effect 
                                                          
6 Cord-cutter refers to consumers who cancel their linear tele-
vision service to watch content online; cord-never refers to 
younger consumers who have never subscribed to television 
and have grown up watching content online and on mobile de-
vices. 
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new entrants into the market like Hulu and Netflix have 
had, especially in terms of forcing the entrenched 
powers’ hands. 
3.2. Hulu 
Part of the SVOD classification of online services, Hulu 
was conceived as a web-based TV distribution portal in 
2007; by 2008, the venture was ready for launch to the 
public and rolled out the red carpet by purchasing an 
ad during the Super Bowl in early 2009 featuring 30 
Rock star Alec Baldwin promoting the service (Stone, 
2009). The choice of Baldwin was not a coincidence as 
Hulu initially grew via partnership with NBCUniversal 
and News Corp. (owners of Fox) and was given an un-
specified amount of money that would be allotted for 
advertising the nascent platform on networks owned 
by the media giants (the Super Bowl aired on NBC that 
year). Hulu also received $100 million in investment 
capital from Providence Equity Partners in 2007 
(James, 2012), a global investment firm which created 
Newport Television, LLC, a holding company founded 
for the express purpose of purchasing Clear Channel 
Communications’ 56 television stations. Furthermore, 
Disney became a partner in 2009, adding content from 
its family of channels to Hulu (Kramer, 2009); more im-
portantly, though, was the addition of three Disney ex-
ecutives to Hulu’s board: Chairman Bob Iger, co-chair 
Anne Sweeney, and executive vice president Kevin 
Mayer. Combined with NBCUniversal and News Corp. 
members, the board of directors at Hulu could be easi-
ly mistaken with any traditional television giant’s. 
Disney’s investment in Hulu was critical to the via-
bility of the platform because it extended the exclusive 
agreements with NBC and News Corp. whereby only 
Hulu would have access to content licensed by the in-
vestment partners (agreements which were about to 
expire) for another two years. One final aspect of the 
Disney deal that exemplified the power wielded by the 
major media conglomerates was that some of Disney’s 
most popular programming would be initially unavaila-
ble on Hulu, including Hannah Montana (2006-2011) 
and High School Musical (2006) (Schechner & Holmes, 
2009). By denying users its most popular programming, 
Disney was flexing its muscles and letting it be known 
in no uncertain terms that traditional television powers 
would dictate, at the very least, the content available 
to Hulu users. 
Beyond major media conglomerate investment and 
executive board occupation, Hulu also follows the ad-
supported model of American television. Hulu initially 
launched as a completely free service that generated 
revenue by inserting ads throughout a television epi-
sode. While much of the world operates under a public 
television model whereby governments fund pro-
gramming to varying degrees and by a variety of meth-
ods (Hoskins, McFadyen, & Finn, 1997, pp. 92-95), the 
United States has, from its inception, been strongly in-
fluenced by neoliberal ideology. Either through pro-
gram sponsorship or selling time during a broadcast for 
advertising, American television has consistently been 
organized around a free market approach. Hulu is no 
different, as it inserts advertising breaks throughout a 
user’s viewing session (although a user is able to group 
together the advertisements at the beginning if she 
wants to watch uninterrupted). Hulu did introduce a 
subscription option that with limited ads and premium 
programming options for $7.99 per month, although 
the premium tier only has 9 million subscribers as of 
2015, nearly 50 million behind rival Netflix 
(Kastranakes, 2015). The company has not released 
numbers for how many users opt for the free version 
of the site, but it seems apparent based on the 700 mil-
lion hours watched in the first quarter of 2015 that 
there are far more users choosing the free model 
(Neuts, 2015). Hulu’s subscription numbers are not 
worthy of ridicule; indeed, they have shown impressive 
growth recently. However, this does not deny that the 
service’s most active business model is the free, ad-
supported one, a model that is derived explicitly from 
the traditional American television model. 
Far from being economically and formally disrup-
tive towards the broadcast model of television, Hulu 
seems to have largely adopted the dominant cultural 
model for American television. Even subscription pric-
ing speaks to the model pioneered by HBO and other 
premium cable networks. Hulu should be considered 
an important part of the new televisual landscape, 
though, as many networks are partnering with the 
company to distribute content online. Comparing Hulu 
to a much different model will help illustrate how in-
debted the platform is to traditional television. 
3.3. Netflix 
Starting out as a retail DVD distribution service, Netflix 
initially emphasized cinema over television series and 
served as competition for brick-and-mortar video rent-
al stores like Blockbuster and Hollywood Video. How-
ever, founder Reed Hastings always intended for Net-
flix to be an Internet-based service, glibly remarking 
that there was a reason it was called Netflix and not 
‘DVD-by-Mail’ (Hastings, 2005). In 2007, Netflix 
launched its streaming service and by 2009 had accu-
mulated 3 million users, an unusually robust level of 
growth for a nascent service in an emerging field of 
media distribution (Roth, 2009). Shortly thereafter in 
2012, Netflix released its first in-house production, 
Lilyhammer (2012–2015), and has since continued to 
ramp up its TV and film production with critically ac-
claimed content like House of Cards (2013–), Orange is 
The New Black (2013–), and Beasts of No Nation 
(2015). Clearly Netflix envisions itself as a major player 
in the media industry; indeed, Hastings has suggested 
 Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 131-141 137 
that the traditional linear model of television will be 
extinct within 10 to 20 years due to consumer demand 
(Yarow, 2015). However, while such growth and pro-
duction expansion is important and should not be 
downplayed as it relates to the health of the traditional 
television industry, it is a mistake to assume that the 
ascendance of Netflix is symptomatic of the demise of 
the television as we know it for two reasons: Netflix’s 
business model, as it is structured in 2015, is not ma-
ture enough to judge its viability and viewers’ attention 
is not a zero-sum equation7. 
The first reason scholars should be skeptical of the 
claim that Netflix will revolutionize linear television is 
that its long-term financial viability is far from proven. 
Netflix operates under a SVOD model whereby con-
sumers have access to Netflix’s entire library of content 
for a flat monthly fee. As of the third quarter of 2015, 
Netflix had 43 million American subscribers and 69 mil-
lion global subscribers for their streaming service, 
dwarfing their competition (Netflix, 2015a). Netflix’s 
subscription numbers are certainly impressive, but 
they do not speak to the financial solvency of their 
model, particularly as it relates to their ongoing inter-
national expansion into new markets like Spain, Portu-
gal, and Japan (Mai-Duc, 2015; Scott & Peltier, 2015). 
Cultivating their brand in new markets is expensive and 
requires not only capital to develop their infrastructure 
locally, but also to acquire content that is culturally 
proximate (Straubhaar, 2003) so as to be able to com-
pete with local video-on-demand services, such as Sky 
Italia in Italy and Telefonica’s Movistar TV in Spain (An-
derson & Rolfe, 2015). In the process of entering new 
international markets, Netflix’s revenue streams have 
taken a hit, with the company losing $68 million inter-
nationally in Q3 of 2015 with the company expecting to 
lose $117 million in Q4. These international losses are 
felt throughout the company: in Q4 of 2014 the com-
pany posted a global net income of $83 million; in Q4 
of 2015, Netflix expects to make a net profit of just $10 
million (Netflix, 2015a). While the company expects its 
investment to pay off internationally, local telecom-
munications infrastructure should caution against rosy 
outlooks, particularly in southern European markets 
where broadband penetration rates lag behind the 
United States. 
Netflix also missed its expected domestic subscriber 
growth mark in Q3 of 2015, adding only 880,000 new 
customers, falling short of the projected 1,15 million. 
Poorer-than-expected domestic growth, along with the 
                                                          
7 Netflix has all but disowned its DVD-by-mail service, yet there 
is a large enough consumer base (roughly 5 million) that the 
company cannot kill it off completely. That there is still a rela-
tively large subscriber-base for an ‘outdated’ model suggests 
that for a variety of technological and cultural reasons, signifi-
cant portions of viewers remain committed to older methods 
of media consumption.  
capital required to expand internationally dampened 
investors’ outlook on the company with the stock tum-
bling nearly 20 cents per share after the report was 
announced (Armental & Ramachandran, 2015).8 Inves-
tors appear concerned with the new directions that 
Netflix is taking, but for now it appears that it is too 
early to say whether or not the company is overheating 
through in-house productions and international expan-
sion. The uncertain long-term viability of its business 
model should give scholars caution before accepting 
Reed Hastings’ proclamation that Netflix will be the 
death of linear television. 
The second reason why Netflix is not indicative of 
the impending ‘post-TV’ era is simply that viewers are 
not abandoning television for Netflix. Viewers are able 
to choose from many options in the contemporary me-
diascape, of which Netflix is just but one choice. Ac-
cordingly, we should think about Netflix’s role in the 
contemporary home media market as similar to that of 
television in the middle of the 20th century. Initially 
viewed as a threat to the film industry, television was 
thought to be a cheap alternative to cinema that af-
forded the viewer greater choice in content and a more 
comfortable viewing experience. While television cut 
into movie-going audiences, it eventually came to be 
an important revenue source for movie studios as a 
separate window, as well as a vital advertising outlet 
(Wasser, 2001, pp. 39-45). We should look at Netflix in 
the same way—as a competitor for eyeballs, but also 
an additional revenue outlet for media producers. 
Moreover, streaming platforms like Netflix simply 
are not cannibalizing television at this point in time. As 
of May 2015, Nielsen found that during primetime, tel-
evision accounts for 66% of all home media consump-
tion (Nielsen, 2015b).9 The long-term trend may even-
tually tip the balance of viewing habits in Netflix and 
company’s favor, but at the moment television remains 
king. Just as cinema adapted its business model and 
production practices to television, so too will television 
adapt to streaming competitors. 
Netflix is undeniably altering the ways in which 
people interface with home media, be it through shat-
tering the franchised brick-and-mortar video retail mar-
ket (Herbert, 2014) or popularizing the consumption 
habit of binge-watching. However, Netflix itself admits 
that the entertainment market is big enough for multi-
ple platforms to be successful and that the increased 
competition will lead to improved services from every-
one (Netflix, 2015b). Indeed, as Nielsen found in 2014, 
the increased number of digital services has spurred a 
growth in total media consumption, particularly among 
the prized 18–34 demographic, which saw a 4% increase 
in total hours watched (Nielsen, 2014). Dominant forms 
of mass media have always had to contend with leisure 
                                                          
8 The company’s stock has since rebounded. 
9 Radio accounts for the remaining users. 
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time competitors and, generally, they have survived. 
Television may eventually be relegated to the fate of ra-
dio, but that time has not yet come. 
3.4. YouTube 
YouTube appears to be diametrically opposed to tradi-
tional TV. At Google’s Q2 2015 Earnings Report, Chief 
Business Officer and SVP Omid Kordestani (Google, 
2015) reported more 18–49 year old Americans ac-
cessed YouTube via mobile devices than any cable 
network; moreover, the average amount of time users 
spend on YouTube rose to more than 40 minutes, a 
50% year-over-year increase. A survey conducted by 
DEFY Media (2015) found that 96% of 13–24 year olds 
watch YouTube or similar platforms for an average of 
11.3 hours per week compared to just 81% who watch 
scheduled television. Furthermore, a 2015 Nielsen 
study (2015a) revealed that between December of 
2013 and December of 2014, television viewing by 18–
49 year olds fell by 10% while YouTube use increased 
by 44%. YouTube, it would appear, is cannibalizing tel-
evision audiences. 
Certainly the Google-owned video platform is as-
cendant in the media ecosystem. The service captures 
the millennial zeitgeist of snackable content (Grainge, 
2011, p. 7) while allowing regular people the chance to 
create and disseminate media they create without in-
stitutional gatekeepers. However, it would be a mis-
take to argue that YouTube’s rise signals traditional 
television’s demise. DEFY Media’s survey, while signal-
ing the prominence of YouTube use among 13–24 year 
olds, also speaks to the staying power of television. 
When recorded, live, and online TV habits are com-
bined, respondents reported watching 22.2 hours of 
television per week, almost double that of YouTube 
and similar platforms (DEFY Media, 2015). This suggests 
that rather than YouTube muscling out television for 
viewers’ attention, it has carved out a niche with young-
er audiences, particularly those 24 and under. Addition-
ally, media consumption is not a zero sum game—
viewers may be interacting with two screens at once, 
watching YouTube during commercials for example. 
Another item to consider is that media conglomer-
ates have a symbiotic relationship with YouTube, creat-
ing much of the site’s most popular content and even 
finding talent for traditional television programming. 
While it is true that one of the major appeals of 
YouTube is user-generated content, many of the most 
popular videos on the site are the products of major 
media conglomerates, including TV clips, movie trailers, 
and music videos. The actual percentage of content 
contributed by the traditional media industries is not 
quantified, but a 2007 report puts the number be-
tween 30% and 70% (Holson, 2007). Even if only 30 
percent of YouTube content is owned by media corpo-
rations, it remains a significant percentage and scholars 
should estimate that the percentage of content pro-
duced by media corporations that users watch is closer 
to 70 percent. It should also be noted that YouTube in-
troduced an ad-free subscription service named 
YouTube Red in October of 2015 which could alter the 
dynamics of user expectations. For example, MTV gave 
YouTube star Todrick Hall his own show in 2015, view-
ing it as an opportunity to create content that connects 
with younger viewers. This particular working relation-
ship benefits all parties involved: Hall is given more 
creative opportunities, MTV has access to new audi-
ences, and YouTube potentially gains more users. 
Rather than look at YouTube as assaulting tradi-
tional television, scholars should instead consider the 
complex ways in which the media and tech industries 
negotiate balances of power, particularly as media 
conglomerates absorb aesthetic and economic practic-
es from insurgent platforms. 
4. Conclusions 
Michael Strangelove’s suggestion that ‘post-TV’ ortho-
doxy may be a strawman is well-taken. It is true that 
many scholars and critics writing about the state of 
contemporary television do not explicitly argue that 
the dominant television paradigm has been usurped by 
upstarts like Netflix, Hulu, and YouTube; however, 
what many who write about television distribution and 
consumption do is rhetorically characterize the con-
temporary television landscape in terms of a revolu-
tion. Indeed, despite his stated temperance, Strange-
love posits that “the television industry may be letting 
the audience slip through its hands” in a migration to-
wards digital options (2015, pp. 8-15); moreover, the 
book itself is titled Post-TV! Regardless of their stated 
intentions, Strangelove and others rhetorically position 
traditional television’s death as a fait accompli. 
What this article has done is provided a counterbal-
ance to such arguments by illustrating the myriad ways 
in which the TV industry, in accord with telecommuni-
cations companies, have begun adapting to a new 
technocultural environment where the audience ex-
pects to consume content when, where, and how they 
want. Not only are standalone OTT services becoming 
de rigeur for networks, MVPDs have begun offering 
skinny bundles to consumers and TV Everywhere to 
subscribers. Even the MPAA, normally stridently re-
sistant to any change that might threaten its member 
studios, has recognized the importance of streaming 
services to television, arguing against Congressional 
regulation (Fried, 2015). Rather than declare the con-
temporary era as that of ‘post-TV,’ it seems clear that 
television is in transition and Lotz’s (2007) approach of 
categorizing television in terms of industry practices is 
more useful for scholars (the post-network era seems 
most appropriate). 
It should be noted that because the rate of change 
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in the television industry is so rapid, this article may 
appear outdated soon after publication. That is a nec-
essary risk when writing about industries in flux, but it 
does appear that stabilization is in the near-future as 
cord-cutting rates have slowed and domestic subscrip-
tions to services like Netflix are leveling out. With that 
said, scholars may well want to examine subscription 
rates over a 5–10 year period for Netflix to try and dis-
cern any trends, particularly with regards to the Great 
Recession and subsequent economic recovery. Fur-
thermore, in-depth analyses of the economic success 
or failure of network OTT services, particularly in com-
parison to rival streaming services, might shed further 
light on whether or not consumers really are rejecting 
legacy television in favor of ‘post-TV’ options. 
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